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A CONSERVATIVE STRUGGLES WITH LEMON:
JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY'S
DISSENT IN ALLEGHENY
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationships in America between religion and society, between
church and state, always have been the subject of both political contro-
versy and intellectual difficulty. Founded by persons who at least
"breathed the air" of a continuing religious tradition in the West-and
by some who consciously held to a significantly more substantive reli-
gious faith-the religious sentiment in America has always been strong,
and has never been far below the surface of any vital public discussion. It
is also true, however, that the Founders sought purposely to escape the
world of religious idolatry, the use of religious authority to coerce polit-
ical ends, and the use of political authority to force religious ends.' The
religion clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution express
the Founders' attempt to harmonize this unique civic tension: the Free
Exercise Clause guaranteed freedom of religious expression, while the Es-
tablishment Clause guaranteed the prohibition of a religious-political
wedding designed to manipulate either realm.2
Of the two religion clauses, the Establishment Clause is clearly the
most litigated, with some seventy cases having been decided by the
United States Supreme Court in the last fifty years. A great number of
those cases have been decided under the "test" the Court adopted in
1971 to evaluate possible Establishment Clause violations. In Lemon v.
Kurtzman,3 the Court sought to make consistent its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence by requiring of every statute or governmental act
that it have a secular purpose, that its principal or primary effect neither
advance nor inhibit religion, and that it not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion.4 Yet, unfortunately, these cases represent a
1. See Swift, To Insure Domestic Tranquility: The Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment, 16 HOFSTRA L. Rev. 473 (1988).
2. The clauses provide that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ." U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
3. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4. The Lemon test has been heavily criticized:
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confused and convoluted attempt to understand and apply the Establish-
ment Clause.' The Supreme Court continued this winding and direc-
tionless journey through Establishment Clause jurisprudence when, in
the summer of 1989, it handed down its decision in County of Allegheny
v. ACL U.6 There the Court upheld the County's display of a Chanukah
menorah but held violative of the Establishment Clause the County's dis-
play of a creche depicting the Christian nativity scene. In doing so, the
Court reflected a view of the history of the Establishment Clause that is
indeed questionable, revealed the avowedly secularist aims of the Court's
Lemon test,7 and continued an unfortunate tradition in constitutional in-
terpretation that both generalizes historically specific language and gives
federal judges broad discretion to ovrturn the decisions of elected
officials.
In dissent, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing his first Establish-
ment Clause opinion,' concurred with that part of the Court's decision
upholding the display of the menorah but concluded that the display of
the crbche was not violative of the Establishment Clause. Justice Ken-
nedy asserted that the government has wide latitude in accommodating
The chief objection to these criteria is their lack of any basis in the words of the establish-
ment clause. Nothing in the text requires the government to act always for secular pur-
poses; nothing forecloses the government from advancing or prohibiting religion in general,
or one or more religions in particular, either as a primary or subsidiary effect; and nothing
speaks to the possibility of government and religion becoming entangled in constitutionally
unacceptable ways.
Porth & George, Trimming The Ivy. A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause,
90 W. VA. L. REv. 109, 129 (1987).
5. See L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
163 (1986). Levy states that "[n]o one can make much sense out of the Court's establishment clause
opinions. The Court has reaped the scorn of a confused and aroused public because it has been
erratic and unprincipled in its decisions." Id. at 163.
6. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
7. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court announced that for government
conduct to pass a challenge under the establishment clause it must: 1) have a secular purpose; 2)
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 3) avoid excessive entanglement
of government and religion. Id. at 612-13.
8. Since the writing of the present article, Justice Kennedy has concurred in the Court's deci-
sion of June 4, 1990 in Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct.
2356 (1990). In Mergens the Court granted relief to students who wished to use school facilities for
religious meetings. The Court ruled that denial of the students' request violated the Equal Access
Act which, in turn, was held not to be violative of the Establishment Clause. In his concurrence,
Justice Kennedy wrote that while government cannot give direct benefits to religion to the extent
that it establishes a religious faith "or tends to do so," "incidental benefits" that accompany official
recognition of religious clubs do not establish a religion. Id. at 2377. Justice Kennedy continued in
his insistence that government does not establish religion unless it "coerces" religious participation
or exercise. Id See infra notes 130-139 and accompanying text. Finally, Justice Kennedy contin-
ued his criticism of the "endorsement test." Id. at 2377. See infra notes 152-64 and accompanying
text. Although the concurrence was short, it is important to note that Justice Kennedy made no
mention of the Court's Lemon test. Id. at 2376-78.
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the religious beliefs of its citizens9 and that government "establishes" a
religion only when it uses force or public funds to "coerce" religious affil-
iation or identification."0 Because neither the cr&he nor the menorah
compelled religious conformity, and because both were merely symbolic
governmental accommodations of religion, neither display violated the
Establishment Clause. In this, Justice Kennedy is correct, being consis-
tent with a prior Supreme Court holding.1' Given, however, that the
dissent adheres to the use of the traditional Lemon test, this note posits
that the dissenting opinion's "accommodation" and "coercion" themes
run counter to the neutrality and strict separationist jurisprudence un-
derlying Lemon.
II. FACTS AND ISSUES
Allegheny dealt with the constitutionality of two recurring holiday
displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh, a cr~ehe12
depicting the Christian nativity scene and an 18-foot Chanukah meno-
rah"3 or candelabrum. The menorah was placed outside the Pittsburgh
City County14 building next to the city's 45-foot decorated Christmas
tree. 15 At the foot of the tree was a sign bearing the mayor's name and a
message declaring the city's "salute to liberty."16
On December 10, 1986, the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the
ACLU and seven local residents filed suit against the county and the city,
9. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3135 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 3136. The coercion element in the Establishment Clause holds that before govern-
ment conduct can be held to violate the establishment clause there must be a showing of "direct
governmental compulsion" of an action which "compels others to conform." Coercion was rejected
by the Supreme Court as an element in determining an Establishment Clause violation in Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 438 (1962). See infra text accompanying notes 133-42.
11. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. The cr~che is the visual representation of the manger and the birth of Jesus of Nazareth
whom Christians believe to be Messiah. The cr che was donated to the city by the Holy Name
Society, a Roman Catholic group. It bore a sign to that effect. Id. at 3095.
13. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3093. The menorah is part of the lamp lighting ritual of Chanukah
or Hanukkah, the annual Jewish holiday celebrating Judas Maccabus' rededication of the Temple of
Jerusalem in 164 B.C. "The menorah is owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, erected,
and removed each year by the city." Id.
14. The City-County Building, jointly owned by the City of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County,
houses county administrative offices as well as the mayor's office. Id. at 3094.
15. Id. at 3094.
16. Id. at 3095. The criehe was displayed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County
Courthouse. Id. at 3093. The County Courthouse, owned by Allegheny County, houses county
administrative offices as well as the mayor's office. IAL It is separate and a block removed from the
City-County Building. Id. at 3094. The Grand Staircase is the main part of the Courthouse. Id. at
3093. The cr~ehe's manger had at its crest a sign saying "Gloria in Excelsis Deo" Id. at 3094. The
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seeking to prohibit permanently the county from displaying the creche in
the County Courthouse and the city from displaying the menorah in
front of the City-County Building. 17 Plaintiffs claimed that the displays
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution."
Relying on Lynch v. Donnelly, 9 the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania denied the plaintiff's request for a per-
manent injunction.20 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, dis-
tinguishing Lynch and determining "that the cr6che and menorah must
be understood as endorsing Christianity and Judaism."2 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted the petitions for certiorari of the county, the city,
and Chabad.22 The Court, in determining whether the cr6eche and the
menorah violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, affirmed
the court of appeals with regard to the cr6eche but reversed with regard to
the menorah.23
III. THE DEcIsION OF THE COURT
The Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the court of appeals with re-
gard to the menorah, finding that the menorah did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.24 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
determined that the menorah did not have the prohibited effect of en-
dorsing religion25 given its "particular physical setting."' 26 The fact that
the menorah was in a display with the Christmas tree simply served to
celebrate the "winter-holiday season."'2 7 The tree, because of its size and
central location, served to downplay the menorah and enabled the meno-
rah to communicate that Christmas is not the only way to celebrate the
season.28 The mayor's sign did not represent sponsorship of the religious
beliefs expressed by the symbols; rather, it indicated the nation's cultural
diversity. 29 Asserting that the determination of whether the menorah
17. Id at 3097-98.
18. Id at 3098.
19. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).




24. Id at 3093.
25. Id at 3111-16.
26. Id at 3116.
27. at 3113.
28. Id at 3113-14.
29. Id at 3114-15.
[Vol. 26:107
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would be seen as a governmental endorsement of Judaism turned on a
"reasonable observer" standard, the Court held that it was not likely the
residents of Pittsburgh would see the menorah as such an endorsement.30
Justice O'Connor concurred,3' but Justice Brennan joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens dissented, asserting that the display of the menorah
did in fact violate the Establishment Clause.32
The Court decided 5-4 that the creche did violate the Establishment
Clause. Justice Blackmun's analysis focused on the second prong of the
Lemon test33 and stated that "a statute or practice which touches upon
religion, if it is to be permissible under the Establishment Clause, must
have a secular purpose; it must neither advance nor inhibit religion in its
principal or primary effect .... ",3 A governmental action advances reli-
gion, Justice Blackmun wrote, when the action makes "adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political com-
munity. ' 35 Thus, the Court held that, in the context in which it was
displayed, the cr6che violated the Establishment Clause because it was
seen to direct observance to Christmas "as a Christian holy day," instead
of acknowledging Christmas simply as a "cultural phenomenon. ' 36 The
Court distinguished Allegheny from Lynch, in which the creche was set
in a context with other secular symbols of Christianity. In Allegheny, the
Court found that there was nothing to detract from the cr~che's sectarian
message; 37 therefore, its display was ruled unconstitutional. 38
The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Scalia joined Justice
Kennedy in dissent, concluding that both the menorah and the cr~ehe
were permissible under the Establishment Clause.39 While giving the
now familiar disclaimer concerning the Lemon test-that it is not a sole
or even primary guide to Establishment Clause cases-Justice Kennedy
sought "to remain within the Lemon framework. . . ."I4 The Lemon
prong implicated in Allegheny was that of primary effect: the law must
neither advance nor hinder religion. Justice Kennedy's analysis seeks to
30. Id. at 3115.
31. I. at 3117,
32. Id. at 3124.
33. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
34. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3100 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
35. Id. at 3101 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
36. Id. at 3105.
37. Id. at 3104.
38. Id. at 3105.
39. Id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
5
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apply the meaning of that part of the test.4"
The ultimate goal of the Establishment Clause, asserted the dissent,
is neutrality.42 This neutrality is not, however, that of a rampant secular-
ism, nor is it one that is hostile to religion. Establishment Clause neu-
trality is that which "permits government some latitude in .
accommodating the central role religion plays in our society."43 Ken-
nedy wrote that the Court must therefore be careful to guard "the border
between accommodation and establishment" of religion."
Justice Kennedy argued that government crosses the line from per-
missible accommodations to an impermissible establishment of religion
when it coerces religious affiliation or aid. 5 Coercion is not limited to
direct coercion, rather "[s]ymbolic recognition or accommodation of reli-
gious faith may violate the Clause... ."46 There is no establishment of
religion, however, when the symbolism is merely "passive."" Ulti-
mately, coercion determines whether government has actually established
a religion.4 8 In determining, in turn, whether government has estab-
lished a religion, Justice Kennedy wrote: "we refer to the other types of
church-state contacts that have existed unchallenged throughout our his-
tory, or that have been found permissible in our caselaw.
' ' a9
Justice Kennedy looked at the Christmas cr6eche upheld in Lynch 5 0
and the saying of legislative prayers upheld in Marsh v. Chambers"1 and
indicated that the primary effect prong of Lemon should be interpreted
through the idea of governmental coercion. 2 These precedents, Ken-
nedy concluded, show that "[n]on-coercive government action within the
realm of flexible accommodation or passive acknowledgment of existing
symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it benefits reli-
gion in a way more direct and more substantial than practices that are
accepted in our national heritage."95 3
Applying his interpretation of Lemon's second prong to the facts of
41. Id
42. Id at 3134-35.
43. Id at 3135.
44. Id
45. Id. at 3137.




50. Id at 3137-38.
51. Id at 3138.
52. Id at 3139.
53. Id at 3138.
[Vol. 26:107
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Allegheny, Justice Kennedy failed to find any governmental coercion. He
found that the county did not further religious interests: no significant
amount of tax money was expended; no one was compelled to worship;
the government made no effort to proselytize.5" Furthermore, the con-
text of the display, Justice Kennedy asserted, was not the physical setting
of the display itself; it was rather the "[religious symbol] in the context of
the [holiday] season.""5 This means that neither the display of the creche
nor the menorah moved government down the "forbidden road" of es-
tablishment.5 6 The Court's use of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test,
wrote Justice Kennedy, would only serve to undo many of the traditional
practices that recognize the part religion plays in our society. 7
The dissent criticized the majority for the use of its "least religious
means test," a requirement that government should always use a more
secular alternative when it can in order to accomplish a legitimate goal.5 8
The majority used the test to strike down the cr6che display. The test,
asserted Justice Kennedy, was inconsistent as used in the Court's opinion
because it undermined the Court's affirmation of a permissible use of a
creche. It was unworkable because it puts the Court in a position to
determine what looks "out of place," and it did not comport with the
Court's decision in Lynch. 9 If Lynch were still good law, wrote Justice
Kennedy, the menorah and the cr eche would have survived an Establish-
ment Clause challenge.'
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY
Modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence dates to the Supreme
Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Education.6' There, Justice Hugo
54. I& at 3139.
55. Id (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1894)).
56. Id at 3140.
57. Id at 3142-43.
58. Id
59. Id
60. Id. at 3140.
61. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The principal passage of Justice Black's opinion provided that:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-at-
tendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In
1990]
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L. Black promulgated for the Court what would become a theoretical
and historical consensus with regard to the Establishment Clause upon
which a generation of later cases would be decided. 62 The Everson court
emphasized three aims of the Establishment Clause: neutrality,63 volun-
tarism, and separatism.6
The Everson court asserted that the standard the Constitution re-
quires concerning the relation between religion and government is neu-
trality.65 The main theme of neutrality entails prohibitions of
government aid to religion.66 In other words, "the standard demands a
neutrality between religion and no religion" and thus "prohibits govern-
mental preference for religion" in general.67 As Justice Black inferred,
government may not aid religion at all.68 At the same time, however,
Justice Black wrote that government could not exclude anyone from the
general benefits of social welfare legislation on the basis of their reli-
gion.69 While the "social benefit" exception served to mitigate the strict
neutrality theme of Everson, embodying "an ideal of equal aid to religion
and nonreligion,"70 the spirit and the use of the word "neutrality"
seemed to become dominant in the Court's Establishment Clause analy-
sis, emphasizing separation between government and religion.71
The Everson court also saw separation as one of the main roots of
the Establishment Clause, as it was understood in the early struggle for
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (italics in original)). Justice
Rutledge, dissenting in the Court's holding, did not disagree with Justice Black's reading of the
history. Id. at 31-43.
62. See, e'g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961);
Illinois ex reL McCullom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
63. "[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power
is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
For a critical analysis of the neutrality theme in Everson and in later cases, see Valauri, The Concept
of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PrTT. L. REv. 83 (1986).
64. For an excellent discussion of the voluntarist and separationist themes, see Van Alstyne,
Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly,
1984 DUKE L.J. 770.
65. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
66. Id.
67. See Evans, Contradictory Demands on the First Amendment Religion Clauses: Having It
Both Ways, 30 J. CHURCH & ST. 463, 482 (1988).
68. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
69. Id. at 16.
70. See Valauri, supra note 63, at 98.
71. See L. LEvY, supra note 5, at 123.
[Vol. 26:107
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religious liberty in Virginia.7 2 Significantly, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the separationist theme to mean more than just institutional sepa-
ration between church and state. Separation has been interpreted to
mean that the state should not derive its claim to authority from religious
sources, that religious groups should not be granted governing power,73
and that religious differences should not be allowed to divide the political
community.74
Voluntarism is also important to the Court's understanding of the
Establishment Clause, particularly as the Clause is comprehended in re-
lation to the free exercise clause. The latter certainly was intended to
assure the freedom of conscience, as well as toleration for different reli-
gious sects, and it clearly prohibits "any degree of compulsion in matters
of belief.'"7 Thus, if religious groups are to prosper they must do so on
the basis of the merit of their own views, not on the basis of governmen-
tal coercion in their favor. Individuals should be left free to affiliate, or
not to affiliate, with a religious view, free from the oppressive hand of
government.76
The themes of neutrality, separatism, and voluntarism, fully articu-
lated for the first time in the Everson decision, found their fullest system-
atic expression in the Court's decision in Lemon.77 There, the Court
gleaned from its previous cases a three pronged test to be used to deter-
mine whether a state action violates the Establishment Clause: "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with reli-
gion.' "78 The Everson emphasis on neutrality is seen in Lemon's first
and second prong;79 the emphasis on separation is found in the third
72. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
73. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrunTONAL LAW § 14.3, at 1161 (1988).
74. While the Court has struck down various programs (particularly aid to parochial schools)
that were likely to generate religious based political division (see, eg., Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)), a threat of political divisiveness is not enough,
without more, to justify striking down a challenged program. See, eg., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 684 (1984).
75. See L. TRIBE, supra note 73, § 14-3, at 1160.
76. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
78. Id at 612-13 (citations omitted) (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (quot-
ing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
79. See Evans, supra note 67, at 482.
1990]
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prong.8 0 The voluntarist idea underlies the whole.8" Despite contradic-
tory results82 and failures always to apply the Lemon test formally, the
Everson-Lemon approach to the Establishment Clause had, before 1985,
reached the status of being a consensus on the Court.
There has developed, however, in the past several years, a body of
historical evidence that stands in opposition to the neutrality-separation-
ist themes of the Court's Everson-Lemon tradition.83 Much of this evi-
dence suggests that the purpose of the Establishment Clause was not to
forbid the government from legislating on the subject of religion, but it
was rather to protect state religious establishments84 from "disestablish-
ment," and to prevent the national government from giving aid to one
religion over another.85 This "no preference" understanding of the Es-
tablishment Clause holds that the Clause primarily was meant to prohibit
the establishment of a national church or religion and to prevent the
preference of one religious group over another. The Establishment
Clause does not require the "high and impregnable" wall of separation of
church and state, and it was not meant to prohibit all government aid to
religion in general or state accommodations of religion.86
The academic debate over the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause reached the Supreme Court in 1985 in the case of Wallace v. Jaf-
free.87 The Court struck down an Alabama statute permitting medita-
tion or voluntary prayer in schools.88 The Court's opinion dealt with a
defense of the Court's precedents that had been attacked in the District
80. See L. TRIBE, supra note 73, § 14-14, at 1278.
81. Id § 14-3, at 1160-61.
82. See Valauri, supra note 63, at 94-106. See also L. LEvY, supra note 5, at 162-63.
83. The academic debate and the literature describing it are extensive. The following citations
are only a sampling: R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION (1982); T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); L. LEvY, supra note 5; Aspen, Some
Thoughts on the Historical Origins of the United States Constitution and the Establishment Clause, 21
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 239 (1988); Dunsford, The Relevance of Original Intention in Thinking About
Establishment Clause Problems, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 197 (1987); Laycock, "Nonpreferen-
tial" Aid To Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1986);
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933 (1986);
Porth & George, supra note 4; Van Alstyne, What is "An Establishment of Religion?," 65 N.C.L.
Rnv. 909 (1987).
84. At the time of the passage of the Constitution in 1787, many states had "established reli-
gions," i.e., churches officially sponsored by the state, and maintained at taxpayer's expense. See L.
LEvY, supra note 5, at 162.
85. See Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of the First
Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 137-38 (1986).
86. Id. at 133-36.
87. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
88. Id at 61.
[Vol. 26:107
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Court below. The opinion did not debate the history of the Establish-
ment Clause.8 9 Justice O'Connor's concurrence reasoned that the his-
torical question concerning public schools was an open one, since the
Framer's of the First Amendment had not dealt with the issue.90
Then Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Jaffree, however, challenged the
Court's Everson history directly for the first time and posed a "non-
preferentialist" theory underlying the Establishment Clause.91 Rejecting
completely Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor as fairly explaining
the Framer's intent, and instead depending upon post First Amendment
church-state involvements enacted by the first Congress,92 Justice Rehn-
quist wrote that the Establishment Clause was meant to prohibit a "na-
tional," as well as governmental preferences for one religious
denomination or sect over others.93 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist
wrote, the Establishment Clause did not require "government to be
strictly neutral between religion and irreligion,"94 it did not prohibit
government "from pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscrim-
inatory sectarian means," 95 and it did not prohibit the government from
providing non-discriminatory aid to religion.96 The dissent reviewed as
89. Id. at 48-56.
90. Id, at 80-81.
91. IAL at 113.
92. Id. at 100-06. Robert Cord noted five post adoption practices as significant in helping to
understand the intentions of the Framers of the establishment clause. First, on the same day that
Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, Madison introduced a bill to punish
"sabbath breakers," which later became law. Second, following the aflirmative vote to recommend
the Bill of Rights to the states for ratification, the first Congress proposed a resolution asking Presi-
dent George Washington to issue a Thanksgiving proclamation (setting aside a day of "public humil-
iation and prayer"). When James Madison, author of the original draft of what would become the
Bill of Rights, became President, he issued four such Thanksgiving proclamations. On Madison's
latter day recanting of the constitutionality of such measures-found in his "Detached Memo-
randa"--see L. LEvy, supra note 5, at 98-99. Third, the first Congress established and funded the
Congressional Chaplain system, James Madison being one of the six members of the Joint Congres-
sional Committee recommending the system. Fourth, in 1803, President Jefferson signed a United
States Senate Treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians which provided for the United States to build a
Roman Catholic church and to provide a yearly stipend for the priest for missionary work. And,
finally, from 1796-1804, the U.S. Congress passed laws that paid, in large land grants, an evangelical
Christian sect to spread and maintain the gospel among Indians in the Territory of Ohio. Presidents
Washington, Adams, and Jefferson all signed these various laws into law. These examples of reli-
gious accommodation in the years immediately following the passage of the Bill of Rights casts at
least some doubt on the neutrality and separationist themes of the Court's Everson tradition. See
Cord, Founding Intentions and the Establishment Clause Harmonizing Accommodation and Separa-
tion, 10 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 49-51 (1987).
93. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 106.
94. Id at 113.
95. Id
96. Id. at 106.
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well a significant amount of pre-adoption First Amendment history.97
The debate over the intention of the Framers of the Establishment
Clause shows no sign of being reconciled. Clearly, there is now disagree-
ment in the Supreme Court between the traditional Everson-neutrality-
separationist history and the more recent "no-preferentialist" history of
the clause. Justice Kennedy's dissent in Allegheny is influenced by both
historical schools of thought. His loyal adherence to the Lemon test98
and to its goal of neutrality for the Establishment Clause99 belies his de-
pendence on the Everson theory. However, his emphasis on coercion as
an element in Establishment Clause violations,"° and on the permissibil-
ity of symbolic governmental accommodations of religion "that have ex-
isted unchallenged throughout our history"' 01 indicate a dependence on
the non-preferential history of the Establishment Clause.
97. Id. at 92-100. There are two major points in this pre-adoption history. First is the back-
ground of the struggle for religious liberty in Virginia. In response to a bill proposed in the Virginia
legislature in 1784 requiring a general assessment tax for the support of the Christian religion, James
Madison wrote his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments," part of
which states:
We remonstrate against the said Bill,
3. Because ... [w]ho does not see that the same authority which can establish Christi-
anity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?
11. Because, it will destroy that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of
our laws to intermeddle with Religion, has produced amongst its several sects.
THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY IN His OWN WORDS 183-91 (M.
Peterson ed. 1974). For the full text, see the appendix in Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson, 330
U.S. at 63. The Virginia legislature subsequently defeated the general assessment bill and adopted
instead Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom which prohibited compulsive
support for religious worship. See Swift, supra note 1, at 492-96.
The second major element of the pre-adoption history regards the debates in the First Congress
coricerning the language of the First Amendment. James Madison, in defending his proposed, but
amended, language ("no religion shall be established by law") said that "he apprehended the mean-
ing of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observa-
tion of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 730 (J. Gales ed. Aug. 15, 1789). Madison had originally proposed the
phrase so as to include the adjective "national" before "religion" because:
[h]e believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine
together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform. He
thought if the word 'national' was introduced, it would point the amendment directly to
the object it was intended to prevent.
Id. at 731. The word "national" was left out of the proposed amendment because it was feared that
it would offend the Antifederalists who did not view the new general government as a "national"
one, consolidating the Union, but rather simply a Federal government. Id. at 731. But see L. LEvy,
supra note 5, at 75-89.
98. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 3135.
100. Id. at 3137.
101. Id.
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It seems doubtful that a consistent and principled Establishment
Clause jurisprudence could ever result from the kind of methodological
tension found in the Allegheny dissent. It doesn't seem possible to syn-
thesize the requirement in Lemon that the governmental purpose be sec-
ular with a holding that symbolic governmental accommodations "that
have existed throughout our history" are constitutionally permissible.
Since many of these governmental accommodations are manifestly reli-
gious, how can they withstand the rigid secularity requirement of
Lemon? Nor does it seem possible to synthesize the demand in Lemon
that government neither advance nor inhibit religion with the idea that
government establishes a religion only when it coerces support of or par-
ticipation in any religion or its exercise. Indeed, it is possible for a gov-
ernmental act actually to advance the cause of religion (e.g., protecting
religious freedom against persecution) without coercing anyone's belief
or practice. Justice Kennedy's holding-to uphold the menorah and the
creche-would have been better explained from the standpoint of a non-
preferentialist history of the Establishment Clause. However, this would
have required a rejection of the Lemon test, which Justice Kennedy was
unprepared to do. An analysis of the resulting tension follows.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE DISSENT
Section III of this article outlined Justice Kennedy's dissent in Alle-
gheny, showing how he urged a "coercion" test to be made applicable to
the second prong ("principle or primary effect") of the Lemon test. Ar-
guing that "primary effect" is a standard that is unduly hostile to religion
in our country-at least in its application-and that Justice O'Connor's
"endorsement" test (applied as well to the second prong of Lemon) is a
"recent" and "unwelcome" addition to Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence,10 2 Kennedy seemed to be elucidating a new reading of Lemon.
The Analysis section of the paper will evaluate Justice Kennedy's
dissent from various different perspectives, cumulatively designed to
show that the real themes of the dissent-accommodation and coer-
cion-struggle against Lemon and its underlying separationist and neu-
trality foundations.
102. Id. at 3141. Because the endorsement test "embraces a jurisprudence of minutiae, a review-
ing court must consider whether the city has included Santas, talking wishing wells, reindeer, or




McArtor: A Conservative Struggles with Lemon: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1990
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
A. Neutrality and Accommodation
Justice Kennedy's dissent is characterized chiefly by the tension
found in it between the competing themes of neutrality and accommoda-
tion. Unwilling to overturn Lemon,"0 3 Justice Kennedy asserted that the
goal of the Establishment Clause was that of "neutrality."'" As previ-
ously discussed, 05 the idea that governmental neutrality toward religion
underlies the Establishment Clause is the traditional Supreme Court his-
tory of the Establishment Clause, originating in Everson. At the same
time, however, Justice Kennedy asserted that "the Establishment Clause
permits government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating
the central role religion plays in our society."'"1 6 A "categorical ap-
proach," Kennedy wrote, would require federal courts to maintain an
"absolute 'wall of separation,' sending a clear message of disapproval" to
the religious community,"0 7 and thus denigrating the "wall of separa-
tion" metaphor so important to the neutrality approach to the Establish-
ment Clause.10 8 Further on, Justice Kennedy asserted that to determine
a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Court must "refer to the
other types of church-state contacts that have existed unchallenged
throughout our history, or that have been found permissible in our
caselaw,"''  and that no Establishment Clause violation exists unless the
governmental action "benefits religion in a way more direct and more
substantial than practices that are accepted in our national heritage."
110
The "history""11 and "any more than""' 2 tests align themselves with
those cases in which the Supreme Court has disfavored the use of the
103. Id at 3134 ("I am content for present purposes to remain within the Lemon framework, but
do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as our primary guide in this
difficult area."). Along with the last statement, however, was Justice Kennedy's approving quota-
tion of Chief Justice Burger's language in Lynch: "we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id. at 3134 (quoting Lynch v.
Donnally, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984)). Justice Kennedy then wrote that "[s]ubstantial revision of our
Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order .. ." Id
104. Id. at 3135.
105. See supra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
106. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3135 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107. Id
108. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
109. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3137 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
110. Id at 3138.
111. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983), where the Court used a "unique history"
test to uphold the constitutionality of legislative chaplains. See also Cord, supra note 63, at 165-66.
112. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-82. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 782-
[Vol. 26:107
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Lemon test and has favored a more accommodationist approach to gov-
ernmental recognition of religion.11
Justice Kennedy did indeed tip his hat to the forms of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence since Everson, with its emphasis on
separation, voluntarism, and federalism. 114 But where, in Lynch, at least
a half-hearted attempt was made to apply the Lemon test,11 Justice Ken-
nedy failed truly to apply Lemon to the situation in Allegheny. The only
Lemon factor implicated in the Allegheny case, the dissent asserted, was
the second prong or "principal or primary effect" part of Lemon.1 16 This
does not seem, however, to be a major part of the dissent. The "principal
or primary effect" prong of Lemon is the focus in Allegheny, but while
Justice Kennedy attacked the majority's use of Justice O'Connor's "en-
dorsement" test to Lemon's second prong,1 7 he did not himself stay true
113. The demise of the Lemon test may have begun in the case itself. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at
614 ("[the establishment clause erects] a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship."). Time and again, the Court has refused to be bound by
the test. See, eg., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (and cases cited therein); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
394 (1983) (the test is "no more than [a] helpful signpos[t]") (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741) (1973)); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980)
(under the Lemon test, the Court has sacrificed "clarity and predictability for flexibility"); Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 n.31 (1973) (the test is only a
guideline) (referring to Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971)).
114. Professor Van Alstyne asserts separation, voluntarism and federalism to be the values un-
derlying the establishment clause. See Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 774 ("Accepted at face value,
the concerns of voluntarism, separatism, and federalism were not at odds with one another. They
framed no tension; rather, they mutually reinforced a single proposition: Questions of religious
choice were not to be the business of the national government."). See also Van Alstyne, supra note
83. But see Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 1115,
1135 n.109 (arguing that if voluntarism and separation had truly been at the heart of the first amend-
ment, the amendment would never have been enacted by those states which at the time maintained
established religions).
115. See Van Astyne, supra note 64, at 782.
116. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In regard to the secular purpose
prong of Lemon, Justice Kennedy criticized Justice Blackman's dependence on the "least religious
means" or "more secular alternative" test. Id at 3143. Typically, when referring to the Court's
evaluation of the governmental action in relation to a secular purpose, a type of "least religious
means test" is used, formulated first by Justice Brennan in his Abington concurrence:
What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the Establishment
Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of religious with secular institutions which
(a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of
government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends, where secular means would suffice.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). The
language in Brennan's concurrence seems to indicate that the Establishment Clause is violated when
government uses religious forms as a willful tool of a secular purpose. As Professor Van Alstyne
notes, Chief Justice Burger "virtually stood the Brennan criteria upside down" when, in Lynch, the
Chief Justice declared that "any discernable secular purpose, no matter how minor" is enough, and
that it is irrelevant if government has used essentially religious means to accomplish this goal. See
Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 784 n.47.
117. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3142.
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to the Court's traditional approach in this area. His use of the "coer-
cion" standard11 seems out of step with the traditional way of evaluating
whether a governmental action has the primary effect of advancing
religion.
119
A standard way of applying the second prong of the Lemon test is
not Justice Kennedy's intent. Rather, his reasoning seems to run like
this: governmental action, in the forms of direct or indirect symbolic
recognition of religion and of the accommodation of religious practices,
violates the Establishment Clause when it becomes coercive. Ultimately,
however, to determine when an establishment has occurred, when gov-
ernment action becomes coercive, an appeal to history is made.120 This
does not appear to be a serious application of the Lemon test: the opinion
seems to depend more upon "the other types of church-state contacts
that have existed unchallenged throughout our history" than upon the
application of the primary effect prong of Lemon; and the "coercion"
standard seems out of step with the Court's traditional application of
Lemon's second prong.
Justice Kennedy might be better to discard neutrality altogether as
the theoretical goal of the religion clauses. An argument can be made
that the Everson neutrality vision is internally contradictory,12 1 and that
this fact leads to the contradictory results in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence.12 2  Furthermore, Justice Kennedy's type of neutrality--one
118. See id. at 3136-37.
119. The traditional way is that the governmental act violates the Establishment Clause if it has
"the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-84 n.39 (1973).
120. It is unclear why the dissent does not begin the analysis with historical practices in the first
place.
121. See, eg., Valauri, supra note 63, at 86. Professor Valauri's position is that the idea of
"neutrality" as used by the Supreme Court in Establishment Clause cases is complex, formal, and
ambiguous. He finds two actual neutrality requirements in Everson, the Court's seminal establish-
ment clause case, and believes that this initial tension has led inevitably to the Court's confusing
establishment clause holdings. Valauri writes:
Everson created a dilemma when it simultaneously adopted two different and incompatible
conceptions of Establishment Clause neutrality-a separationist conception prohibiting aid
to religion and an accommodationist conception allowing religious participation in secular
governmental programs of general social benefit.
AAd at 86 (footnotes omitted).
122. For example, a State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that
contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for
use in geography class. A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it
may not lend a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class.
A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend workbooks in which the paro-
chial school children write, thus rendering them nonreusable. A State may pay for bus
transportation to religious schools but may not pay for bus transportation from the paro-
chial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip. A State may pay
16
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that is self-consciously accommodationist as in the Lynch tradition 123 -
may not be able to withstand the scrutiny of the different types of neu-
trality found in Establishment Clause jurisprudence: strict neutrality,
political neutrality, denominational neutrality, and free exercise neutral-
ity.121 Under any of these neutrality schemes, Laurence Tribe has
pointed out that cases like Lynch and Marsh are difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to justify.'25 The chief reason for this difficulty is the idea that time,
traditional practice, and context effectively neutralize the religious qual-
ity of some messages.126 Thus, in Marsh and Lynch, the Court implied
that the saying of legislative prayers and the display of the creche, respec-
tively, were religious practices that had been divested over time of their
religious import. 27 But such an exception to the requirement of neutral-
ity, argues Professor Tribe, threatens to undercut completely the rule
stemming from the secular purpose requirement of Lemon prohibiting
government from the use of religious means to accomplish secular ends
when there are secular means available to accomplish the task.128 For
"time may restore what it has removed,"' 129 and symbols now secularized
may once again be invested with their traditional religious impact such
that the autonomy of religious non-adherents will clash with the religious
sentiments of the majority. Neutrality then, as a theoretical construct,
for diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic services must be
given in a different building.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
123. [T]he metaphor ["wall of separation"] itself is not a wholly accurate description of the
practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state .... Nor
does the Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively man-
dates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any.
Lynch, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 315 (1952); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948)).
124. See L. TRIBE, supra note 73, § 14-7, at 1188-201. "Strict neutrality" forbids religious classi-
fications to be made by government and seems at odds with the free exercise clause. Id. at 1188-89.
"Political neutrality" permits some religious classifications based either on a "secularly relevant fac-
tor" or for the purpose of denying "benefits to a religious organization that abuses those benefits in a
manner that distorts the principle of religious voluntarism." Id. at 1189-90. "Denominational neu-
trality" "prevents the state from drawing lines between religions, when such lines are not supported
by any free exercise argument." Id. at 1190. "Under free exercise neutrality,... the government
may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices." Ia at 1193 (quoting Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Conm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1051 (1987)). See, eg., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
125. L. TRIBE, supra note 73, § 14-15, at 1284-97.
126. Ia at 1294.
127. Ia at 1294-95.
128. See supra note 91.
129. L. TRIBE supra note 73, § 14-15, at 1296.
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seems to be essentially antithetical to the expression by the political com-
munity of any shared religious beliefs. Adoption by the dissent of a
strictly non-preferential and accommodationist goal of the Establishment
Clause would render unnecessary the need of the Court to justify its dis-
cussions on the basis on "neutrality" and to use the beleaguered Lemon
test.
B. Coercion as a Standard
Justice Kennedy applied as a standard or test on Establishment
Clause claims that of requiring a finding of a coercive governmental act
before a violation could be declared. 130 While the traditions of the coun-
try and the theory of the Establishment Clause "permiti government
some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role religion
plays in our society,"1'' the dissent noted there is always a need to ob-
serve the border between accommodation and establishment. Govern-
ment goes from accommodation to establishment when it "coerce[s]
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise." '132
The majority rejected Justice Kennedy's requirement of coercion in
finding an Establishment Clause violation, citing precedents. 133 In con-
currence, Justice Stevens noted that a showing of indirect or direct coer-
cion in Establishment Clause cases is "out of step with our precedent."' 134
This may be true, but in requiring the coercion standard, Justice Ken-
nedy seems to have history on his side.
Justice Kennedy quoted as authority for his position on coercion
James Madison's statement in the First Congress regarding the bill for
taxes for the support of religion.135 If Madison's words are any indica-
tion of the intent of the establishment clause, coercion is an essential
element. If coercion of religious affiliation and support is the primary
130. [Flor it would be difficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of more
or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply the substantial benefits that
would sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or governmental
exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing.
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3136 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131. Ia at 3135 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
132. Ia at 3136.
133. aI. at 3103 n.47. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun cited with approval the
Court's words in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ('The Establishment Clause, unlike the
Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate
directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.").
134. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3131 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. See supra note 71. See also Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3136-37 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 26:107
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evil against which the Framers designed the Establishment Clause, the
many post-adoption practices'36 of the Framers and of later Congresses
could not be seen to violate the Establishment Clause. 137
Of course, application of the coercion standard would require modi-
fication of, if not overturning of, the Lemon test which prohibits any
activity that has the effect of advancing religion. The test fails to distin-
guish those actions that attempt to coerce religious belief from those that
merely facilitate the exercise of one's faith. 13  Thus, Lemon has the effect
of being hostile to religious expressions that do not coerce. 39 Therefore,
the effort to hold to a coercion theory of the Establishment Clause and to
the Lemon test with its neutrality theory is inconsistent.
C. Rejection of Adorned/Unadorned
Justice Kennedy is to be commended for his attempt to correct what
seems to have become an often made error in interpreting the Lynch deci-
sion, the idea that because the creche was displayed in a context adorned
by other symbols of the Christmas season more secular in nature the
Establishment Clause was not violated. 4 ° The Allegheny majority used
the Lynch test"' in striking down the county's display of the creche
where it held that the creche stood alone and was "the single element of
136. See supra note 69.
137. See McConnell, supra note 83, at 934-36 (arguing also that the dictum in Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962), is out of step with their previous coercion statements with regard to the Estab-
lishment Clause, most notably Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)). See also American
Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting):
The genesis of the Establishment Clause persuades me that force or funds are essential
ingredients of an "establishment". Yet I offer this conclusion in the spirit of constructive
criticism, because it is plainly not the law today .... The passage is circular: it says that
there needn't be coercion, there need only be "establishment". If establishment means
force or funds, then you can't have one without the other. The passage also is ukase. It is
unreasoned, unsupported by history, and irrelevant to the case at hand.
Id at 137 (emphasis in original). Judge Easterbrook's dissent may be the finest judicial expression to
date of the coercion theory.
138. McConnell, supra note 83, at 940.
139. Recent examples might be Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding
unconstitutional school programs paying public school teachers to teach some nonpublic school stu-
dents conducted in "leased" classrooms in the nonpublic schools) and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985) (holding unconstitutional New York City's use of federal funds to pay the salaries of
public school employees who teach in parochial schools in the City).
140. For a discussion of the influence of this reading of Lynch, see Myers, The Establishment
Clause and Nativity Scenes: A Reassessment of Lynch v. Donnally, 77 Ky. L.J. 61, 70-90 (1988-89).
141. This supposed test of the Lynch Court has been given various names, one of which is the
"St. Nicholas too" test. See, ag., ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1569 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
1990]
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the display on the Grand Staircase."142 Thus, the cr6eche was held to be
inconsistent with Lynch.
The adorned requirement reading of Lynch stems most probably
from Justice Brennan's dissent in that case, a clever and ultimately suc-
cessful attempt to limit the scope of Lynch. Justice Brennan asserted that
Lynch was a "narrow result which turn[ed] largely upon the particular
holding context in which the city of Pawtucket's nativity scene ap-
peared."143 Three federal courts of appeals adopted Justice Brennan's
interpretation and concluded that particular displays of nativity scenes
were violative of the Establishment Clause. 1" The Second Circuit, how-
ever, in McCreary v. Stone,145 adopted the broader reading of Lynch and
permitted the public display of a nativity scene. "According to this
[broad reading] neither the physical context in which the creche is dis-
played nor the precise location of the display is particularly
significant."'"
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority for threaten-
ing to "trivialize constitutional adjudication"147 by requiring the Court
to investigate whether there were present in Christmas displays Santas
and reindeer.'48 The Court could thus only help lower courts by decid-
ing "a long series of holiday display cases, using little more than intuition
142. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104.
Under the Court's holding in Lynch, the effect of a crche display turns on its setting.
Here, unlike in Lynch, nothing in the context of the display detracts from the cr6che's
religious message. The Lynch display comprised a series of figures and objects, each group
of which had its own focal point. Santa's house and his reindeer were objects of attention
separate from the criche, and had their specific visual story to tell. Similarly, whatever a
"talking" wishing well may be. it obviously was a center of attention separate from the
criche. Here, in contrast, the criehe stands alone: it is the single element of the display on
the Grand Staircase.
Id, at 3103-04.
143. Lynch v. Kurtzman, 465 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. ACLU v. Allegheny County, 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989)
(this was the lower court case in Allegheny); American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d
120 (7th Cir. 1987); ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
421 (1986).
145. 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom., Board of Trustees
v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that: "[t]he Supreme
Court did not decide the Pawtucket case based upon the physical context within which the display of
the criche was situated; rather, the Court consistently referred to 'the creche in the context of the
Christmas season.'" Id. at 729 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984)).
146. Myers, supra note 140, at 72.
147. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
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and a tape measure." 14 9 Justice Kennedy charged the majority with mis-
characterizing the Court's opinion in Lynch as an endorsement-in-con-
text test. 150 From the wording in the Lynch case itself, he appears to be
correct in that the "context" spoken of in Lynch refers not to the physi-
cal setting of the display but to the context of the Christmas season. 151
D. The Endorsement Test
A significant aspect of Justice Kennedy's dissent is devoted to the
Majority's use of the endorsement test,152 made applicable to the "princi-
pal or primary purpose" prong of the Lemon test.153  The dissent has
149. Id at 3144-45.
150. Id at 3144.
151. In this case, the focus of our inquiry must be on the cr6che in the context of the
Christmas season.
When viewed in the proper context of the Christmas Holiday season, it is apparent
that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the
crkche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental
advocacy of a particular religious message.
The display is sponsored by the city to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origin
of that Holiday:
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-81.
152. The scholarly discussion on the endorsement test, particularly as it is formed in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnally, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984), is extensive. See, eg.,
Feder, And a Child Shall Lead Ther Justice O'Connor, The Principle of Religious Liberty and Its
Practical Application, 8 PACE L. REv. 249 (1988); Heck & Arledge, Justice O'Connor and the First
Amendment 1981-84, 13 PEPPERDwnE L. REv. 993 (1986); Marshall, "We Know It When We See
It'" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986); Smith, Symbols, Percep-
tions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH.
L. REv. 266 (1987); Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor, 52 U. Cri. L.
REV. 389 (1985).
153. The endorsement aspect of the Court's decision is found at Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3100-04.
The Court asserted that "in recent years" it has paid close attention to whether the governmental
practice has the effect of "endorsing" religion, but that the term "endorsement" is not "self-defin-
ing." Id at 3100. The Court in Allegheny quoted, among other decisions, Justice Goldberg's con-
currence in Abington: "The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government...
effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion." Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963). In Allegheny, the Court held that "[tihe Establishment Clause,
at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious
belief or from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community."' Id. at 3101 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). Depending exclusively on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch as
the definitive opinion in that controversial case, the Court held that any endorsement of religion is
"invalid" because such an endorsement sends a message to nonadherents of the endorsed religion
that they are not full members of the political community. Id. at 3102. The Court then derived two
relevant constitutional principles: "the government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional
if it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the government's use of religious
symbolism depends upon its context." Id. at 3103. The Court, determining that this latter principle
required the Allegheny County crinhe and menorah to be subjected to the "adorned context" test,
held the cr che violative of the establishment clause because "it endorsed the Christian religion." Id.
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three criticisms of the use of the endorsement test: (1) it violated the
doctrine of stare decisis in Establishment Clause jurisprudence;154 (2) it
prohibited reasonable governmental accommodations of religion that
themselves do not violate the Establishment Clause;155 and (3) it con-
signed to least favored status the beliefs and feelings of adherents to
"[tihose religions enjoying the largest following.' '15 6
Justice Kennedy seems correct in asserting that the endorsement
test violated stare decisis at least in this case because of its relation to
Lynch. Instead of using the principles enunciated in Lynch as controlling
in a like case, such as Allegheny, the majority used Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test in her concurring opinion in Lynch as controlling. 57
As Justice Kennedy points out, the Court extends the rule in Lynch to
include the dissent in that case as well. 5 ' Such an approach is clearly
violative of the doctrine of stare decisis for that principle "directs us to
adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their expli-
cations of the governing rules of law." '159
Justice Kennedy failed to convince, however, when he found that
the endorsement test was more hostile to religious accommodations than
was the traditional application of the Lemon test. For while it is true
that endorsement would require prohibitions of governmental actions
such as legislative prayers and the Presidential proclamation of
Thanksgiving," ° it is not clear that the standard application of Lemon
would permit such accommodations. But such is the dissent's implied
belief: Lemon as it stands, "when applied with proper sensitivity to our
traditions and our caselaw,"' 16 is accommodating to religious affirma-
tions by government; it is endorsement that makes Lemon excessively
secular and hostile to religion. This view does not comport, however,
with what the Supreme Court has actually done.
In Lynch, there is little disagreement that the Court only partially
applied the Lemon test.' 62 In Marsh, the legislative prayer case, Lemon
at 3105. The menorah placed in the context with a Christmas tree and the mayor's sign concerning
liberty was held not to endorse religious faith. Id. at 3115.
154. Id. at 3141.
155. Id at 3142-44.
156. Id at 3145.
157. Id at 3101-03.
158. Id at 3141 n.6.
159. Id at 3141.
160. Id at 3142.
161. Id at 3134.
162. See supra note 112.
[Vol. 26:107
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was not applied at all. 16 3 It is not clear that in those cases, had Lemon
been applied forthrightly, the governmental action could have been up-
held. Lemon does not need the endorsement test to be excessively hostile
to the religious traditions of the American people. Thus, Justice Ken-
nedy's extensive criticism of the endorsement test, while not incorrect,
might better have been aimed at Lemon itself.
E. Incorporation of the First Amendment
The Bill of Rights was originally intended to protect citizens only
from encroachments by the federal government. 164 However, over time,
portions of the Bill of Rights have been "incorporated" to apply to the
States via the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
is true of the Establishment Clause. 165
The incorporation of the Establishment Clause has never been seri-
ously questioned in the Court's jurisprudence. 166  Even then Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Jaffree, the most radical Establishment Clause
opinion on record, accepted the incorporation of that clause without dis-
cussion. 67 Rehnquist did at least mention the fact of incorporation,
which, unfortunately, cannot be said for Justice Kennedy's dissent in
Allegheny.1 68
It may be that it is "too late in the day" to reconsider seriously the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause because of the score of cases
that would thus be overturned. 169  However, the Supreme Court can
undo precedent, and some of its most celebrated cases have done just
163. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I must begin by
demonstrating what should be obvious: that, if the Court were to judge legislative prayer through
the unsentimental eye of our settled doctrine, it would have to strike it down as a clear violation of
the Establishment Clause.").
164. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See also R. BERGER, Gov-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949).
165. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).
166. However, in an interesting recent case, Brevard Hand, Chief Judge for the Southern Dis-
trict of Alabama, ruled that his court had no jurisdiction to rule in an Establishment Clause case
concerning the State of Alabama because "the Constitution had not been amended to incorporate the
first amendment to the states." Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 943 (S.D. Ala.
1987). Predictably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Judge
Hand's argument. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1983). The case reached the
U.S. Supreme Court on the substantive grounds sub nom. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
167. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
168. The majority's opinion asserts the prevailing law in Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3098.
169. This assertion is made by Leonard Levy in L. LEVY, supra note 5, at 165. But see
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 353, 387 (1981).
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this. '7 Furthermore, if there is evidence that the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment specifically did not intend to incorporate the Estab-
lishment Clause, 171 it is not clear why it would be unreasonable for the
Court to consider the evidence expressed in the intentions of the Framers
of both the Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
F. Issues in Constitutional Interpretation
Justice Kennedy does not do a serious historical evaluation of the
Establishment Clause in an effort to find the Clause's original meaning.
Therefore, he is not in a position to criticize as effectively as he could the
Court's interpretive methodology; nor is he able to put forward one of his
own, particularly as it relates to the religion clauses. This is unfortunate,
given the debate going on in constitutional law over the issue of constitu-
tional interpretation generally and of original intent specifically. The is-
sues impinge deeply on the Establishment Clause. If Justice Kennedy
had wanted to write an apologia for the ideas of original intent in inter-
pretation, of judicial restraint, and of the constraining limits that histori-
cal understanding places upon us, this case offered a fine opportunity to
do so.
One issue is how broadly should the Establishment Clause be inter-
preted or, in other words, how high a level of generality should the lan-
guage of the constitutional text be taken? If what appears to be the
intention of the Framers in regard to the Establishment Clause is limited
to the prohibition of the Federal government from preferring one sect or
one religious denomination over another and from establishing a state
church,172 then to broaden the scope of the phrase might mean to pro-
hibit other involvements of government with religion that the Framers
did not intend to prohibit. This approach places the Court in a position
of going beyond the historical limitations placed upon it by the language
of the Constitution and the structure of government which that docu-
ment creates. To do so, the Court, in making substantive decisions of
170. See Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis, L.
REv. 467, 494-96 (1980).
171. From 1875 to 1882, Congress debated a proposal, which never passed, to amend the Consti-
tution in such a way that would have subjected the states to the religion clauses: "No State shall
make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "
See Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REv. 939, 941 (1951) (quot-
ing 4 CONG. REc. 5580 (1876)). The introduction of the amendment and the ensuing floor debates
seem to indicate that, seven years after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, no one believed
the Amendment to make the religion clause applicable to the States. Id.
172. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26:107
24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss1/4
JUSTICE KENNEDY
law, must necessarily have before it a particular social vision that guides
its decisions; it must select a political source "from which to extract con-
cepts of equality and justice," 173 so as to enforce those "values which are
fundamental to our society."' 74 The Court must do this whenever it de-
cides that the text of the Constitution cannot give to courts specific gui-
dance, but rather only speaks in the vaguest and most general of terms,
generalities, however majestic. 1 75 The view that federal courts should go
beyond the specific and historical text of the Constitution and seek to
enforce norms and values not specifically stated or clearly implicit in the
document raises two issues that Justice Kennedy might have addressed
in his dissent: the level of generality at which courts should interpret
constitutional language and the institutional role of the Supreme Court
itself in our system of government.
Much has been written in previous years in the academy concerning
the level of generality of constitutional language.176  The debate has
failed to bring any desired consensus. It is clear that the more general or
abstract way in which one interprets phrases such as "establishment
clause," "equal protection of law," or "due process," the more discretion
a court has in applying the discerned meaning of the phrase to situations
either not foreseen by the authors of the phrase or to situations contem-
plated but for various reasons rejected by the authors. These are ex-
tremely difficult problems, especially realizing that the level of generality
may change from one text to another. Historical intent is often difficult
to find because it is not always clear how much discretion the authors of
a text intended to grant to succeeding generations, and often we face
situations unknown to the various groups of authors of different constitu-
tional texts. Yet, when we can discern with relative certainty a historical
intention, however limiting that intention may be in comparison to our
contemporary standards of equality, justice, freedom, and tolerance, and
when we can determine that the language of the text gives a "rule" re-
quiring certain judicial outcomes in specific situations, instead of a "stan-
dard" that envisions a political value and that invites discretion, the
173. Monaghan, supra note 169, at 355.
174. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 227
(1980).
175. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 945
(1973).
176. Brest, supra note 174, at 204; Ely, supra note 175, at 945. See Monaghan, supra note 169.
See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSmRUST (1980); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,
27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Perry, Interpretivisr, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 261 (1981).
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judicial process that abstracts the rule from its historical limitations
changes, in essence the text itself, though its words remain the same.177
It is a subtle though powerful way of constitutional amendment. It is
possible that the "wall of separation" metaphor and the theory of neu-
trality underlying it have done just this to the Establishment Clause, ab-
stracting it from the limiting "rule" of non-preferentialism to the general
"standard" of neutrality.' 78 Justice Kennedy might have addressed this
fact.
The process of generalization, however, changes not only the mean-
ing of the constitutional text; it changes the institutional role of the fed-
eral courts as well. 179 The courts cease to be the enforcer of political
values explicit in the Constitutional text or clearly implicit in it and be-
come instead "the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty
and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed
as a matter of positive law in the written constitution."' 80 Such a theory
of judicial review is problematic. It seems to run against the grain of the
constitutional structure of government itself that the fundamental polit-
ical values and policy choices of the country will be made by those who
are electorally accountable and not by those who are merely politically
influenced. Neither does such a theory provide protection from abuses of
power in the judicial department. The dissent's failure to address these
problems in any systematic way weakens its force.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ambiguities in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause juris-
prudence stem from a false start in the historical understanding of the
clause, and from the tension created when the Court attempts to combine
competing values such as accommodation and neutrality. This is the leg-
acy of the Everson decision. The result of this case law has been a patch-
work of unprincipled and inconsistent decisions, confusing the citizenry
as to the proper relation between religion and the state, and earning the
Court a lessened sense of public respect.
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Allegheny is influenced by the confu-
sion characteristic of the Court's Establishment Clause decisions. Un-
willing to discard the Lemon test, Justice Kennedy is forced to accept, at
177. See American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 137-40 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 138-39.
179. Id. at 139.
180. Brest, supra note 174, at 227.
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least in large part, that test's goal of neutrality and its underlying separa-
tionist jurisprudence. But it is not clear how this understanding of the
Establishment Clause is consistent with a view that, unless government
coerces religious faith, it is free to accommodate practices that are consis-
tent with the nations history. For there is all the difference in the world
between the requirement that government remain neutral with regard to
religion and irreligion and the freedom of government to accommodate
religious symbolism. The former seems logically to compel a completely
secularist society; the latter permits government's use of religious
symbolism.
The dissent's holding in 41legheny-that both the Chanukah meno-
rah and the Christian cr&he can be permissibly displayed-fits better
with the view that the Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit a
national church as well as official preferences of one religion over an-
other. The dissent's holding is inconsistent with Lemon, and Justice
Kennedy would be encouraged to follow the lead of the Chief Justice
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